The Battle for the Cross Roads at point 148
(147 Carrel Brisquet)

During the rapid march northward on 20 June the 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments had a few brushes with outposts and received some artillery fire. The enemy delaying action, though light, was just sufficient to prevent the two regiments from developing the main German defense line before dark. General Barton ordered attacks by all three regiments on 21 June, the principal tasks being the capture of Hill 178(177 on the modern maps 500meters from the HQ building), west of Ruffosses, which the 8th Infantry had failed to take the day before, the development of the enemy's main line of resistance somewhere beyond the Bois du Coudray, and the cutting of the St. Pierre-Eglise-Cherbourg highway west of Gonneville. These missions were assigned as objectives to the 8th, 12th, and 22d Infantry Regiments, respectively.
Hill 17 8 was north of the east-west road from Hameau Gallis to Delasse(D 56), and beyond the Bois de Roudou. Barring the 8th Infantry's advance from the south were the woods and enemy positions at the northwest tip of the woods. The approach from the east was protected by positions astride the intersection near la Bourdonnerie (Crossroads 148)(147 Carrel Brisquet) and other positions farther north and to the left of the road. The defense overprints did not show exactly what type of positions these were. At the northwest tip of the Bois de Roudou and in the woods north of Crossroads 148(147 Carrel Brisquet the garages) there were numerous huts and concrete structures, and evidence of felling of trees and construction activity had been noted. These were suspected to be buzz bomb sites. The position at Crossroads 148(147 Carrel Brisquet) not only controlled the road intersection but also acted as a buffer for the other positions. Colonel Van Fleet's plan was to have the 1st and 3d Battalions advance north through the woods, while the 2d Battalion would attack the position at Crossroads 148 from the east.

The 1st and 3d Battalions moved out at 1000. The 1st Battalion drove into the woods on the left and then worked northward along the trail on the west edge of the woods. The 3d Battalion, after cleaning out remnants of resistance at Ruffosses with tanks of Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, also entered the woods, swinging north toward the Gallis- Delasse road. Both battalions met heavy fire from the concrete structure at the unfinished installation beyond the northwest tip of the woods and from the fortified barracks east? of the position. Despite artillery support on the initial advance, the battalions were stopped a few hundred yards from their objective by heavy fire from enemy 88-mm. and antiaircraft guns. In the meantime, after artillery and mortar preparations, the 2d Battalion attacked westward against Crossroads 148(147 Carrel Brisquet) and positions to the northwest. Company G shortly became pinned along the north-south road; but Company E went through north of Crossroads 148(147 Carrel Brisquet) and advanced several hundred yards beyond the road. It then discovered that it had passed by the enemy positions at the crossroads and was cut off. Movement became impossible, but something had to be done either to extricate Company E or help G forward.

The battalion commander decided to commit Company F from reserve with a platoon of tanks, organized on the pattern of the infantry-tank team which had proved effective in the Normandy fighting thus far when properly coordinated. The narrow front, however, compelled a bunching of infantry platoons behind the tanks deployed in line, and the tight formation limited freedom of maneuver. Nevertheless, the attack was successful. Tanks sprayed the hedgerows, which, being low at this spot, constituted no obstacle to the advance. The tanks moved cross country easily and the enemy seemed to disappear. Company G fell in behind Company F and the two came up abreast with Company E to reestablish a continuous battalion line. By evening contact was also established with the 3 d Battalion across the road to the south.
Later, however, it became apparent that the Germans were still in position at Crossroads 148(147 Carrel Brisquet). They began to harry the companies from the rear, ultimately cutting the supply route during the night. A reinforced platoon sent to clean out the enemy proved unequal to the task. When at dawn, 22 June, the Germans raided the 2d Battalion command post, Company F was ordered to clear out the bothersome crossroads position once and for all. While one platoon made a wide flanking move to the south, using the Bois de Roudou as concealment, and then moved up the draw through Ruffosses for the attack on the crossroads, arrangements were made for a heavy concentration of mortar and cannon fire on the woods to the north where enemy troops were thought to be concentrated. At a given signal mortars and cannon massed their fires in an 8-minute concentration on the woods
and the maneuvering platoon attacked the crossroads, supported by the fire of another. When the firing ceased, white flags appeared and seventy-four Germans came out of the woods and surrendered. From them it was learned that more were holding out. The heavy fire was therefore repeated and one hundred more gave themselves up. When the wounded were brought in, the total count of prisoners reached nearly three hundred. The threat to the battalion's rear had been eliminated.

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